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I.

Introduction

In the 1980s, public awareness of climate change and pressing environmental issues reached new
heights, leading consumers to be more conscious of the environmental impacts of the products they were
purchasing.1 This purchasing phenomenon is known as “green consumerism.”2 Capitalizing on this trend and
tapping into a new market, companies3 developed marketing strategies advertising products’ environmental
attributes. However, many companies were more concerned with profits than they were with accurate claims
and inundated the market with vague, baseless, and unverifiable environmental claims.4 The term
“greenwashing” emerged in response, which describes the act of misleading consumers about firm
environmental performance or the environmental benefits of a product.5 Although green advertising has a
number of benefits, greenwashing causes consumers to become skeptical of environmentally friendly
products. This paper will show that government regulation of environmental claims is largely fragmented and
piece-meal, and has been weak at best -- primarily existing in the form of non-binding guidance on
environmental claims from the FTC called the Green Guides. As a result, considerably effective marketbased tools, such as environmental watchdogs and certifications from independent voluntary consensus
organizations (“eco-labels”) have emerged to fill the void.
Successful anti-greenwashing campaigns and blogs by environmental watchdogs have powerful and
long-lasting effects on a company’s reputation. And, done well, eco-labels provide a baseline within industry
sectors by encouraging best practices and setting guidelines that companies must meet in order to meet a
1

Glenn Israel, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for Environmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 303-305
(1993), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol20/iss2/5; see generally Nick Feinstein, Learning from Past Mistakes: Future Regulation
to Prevent Greenwashing , 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. (2013), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol40/iss1/6
2
Id.
3
As used in this paper, “company” refers to all of the businesses involved in the distribution of consumer products, including manufacturers,
wholesalers, distributers, retailers, and advertising agencies.
4
Supra note 1.
5
Id.

3

certified criteria. Below, the paper will demonstrate that eco-labels have several demonstrated economic
benefits – they allow consumers to make more informed green purchases, they encourage manufacturers to
make “greener” products, and as a result, the environment benefits. They are also an effective tool for
manufacturers seeking to avoid greenwashing litigation.
However, the paper argues that the efforts of environmental watchdogs are not harmonized and often
suffer from a lack of coordination. Additionally, while eco-label schemes will likely continue to be essential
in validating green claims, they are not without problems. The eco-label landscape is currently highly
fragmented and often confusing to consumers. Consumer confusion continues to grow due to competing
claims on what makes a product “green,” especially when there are two or more competing schemes for the
same sector or product.6 Not all eco-labels are created equally, and can ironically, perpetuate more
greenwashing. Eco-label organizations and the manufacturers that rely on them are not protected from
liability simply because the eco-label is a third party; not only can the eco-label organizations themselves
face deceptive advertising litigation over their standards and certifications, but other bodies of law such as
antitrust, international trade, and tort law may be implicated. And, although there are efforts to oversee and
harmonize eco-labels, those efforts also suffer from a lack of harmonization.
This paper has two primary goals. First, it organizes and examines all of the current anti-greenwashing
efforts. The focus will be on the three principle existing methods of combatting greenwashing; (1)
government solutions (regulations and regulatory guidance), (2) social solutions (grassroot campaigns and
blogs), and (3) market-based solutions (independently certified eco-labels.) Given that the regulatory and
social solutions are reactive solutions, independently certified eco-labels appear to be the most effective way
for companies to proactively avoid greenwashing litigation. Second, this paper organizes and examines the
diverse web of laws that can become implicated once an independently certified eco-label is used. What
becomes clear is that (1) both the efforts to combat greenwashing and the efforts to harmonize eco-label
standard setting are highly fragmented, uncoordinated, and often overlapping, and (2) a company’s use of an
independently-issued eco-label may not be the end of the road, as the use of the eco-label itself may lead to
additional types of liability.

II.

Greenwashing Basics

The 1980s saw a steep rise in U.S. consumer interest in environmentally-friendly products, in large
part attributable to events such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill and an increased awareness of the threats of
global warming and ozone depletion.7 Surveys conducted in the early 1990s revealed that a majority of
Americans worried about the environment and were willing to alter their purchasing behavior to favor

6

See generally, Israel, supra note 1; Feinstein, supra note 1; Jessica E. Fliegelman, Note: The Next Generation of Greenwash: Diminishing Consumer
Confusion Through a National Eco-labeling Program, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. (Oct. 2010);
7
Eric L. Lane, Greenwashing 2.0, 38 COLUMBIA J. OF ENVTL. L. 5 (2013) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2089078 (last visited May 15,
2014).

4

environmental quality.8 This heightened public concern for the environment created a new kind of consumer
who demanded environmentally responsible products, which in turn led manufacturers who saw a chance to
capitalize on a potentially huge market to make claims of eco-friendly products.9 Environmental marketing
grew tremendously in the 1990s, both in corporate product development and advertising campaigns.10 The
demand and market for green products, services, and firm practices has only continued to grow exponentially
in the last twenty years.11
Unfortunately, throughout this growth, many corporations advertised environmental benefits that
were false, misleading, or unsubstantiated, likely preying upon the average consumer, who lacks the
resources to verify marketers’ environmental claims. This rise in unfounded claims, such as “recyclable,” and
“biodegradable” and “green,” increased consumers’ confusion. In response, lawmakers and environmental
groups began to focus on how to address the greenwashing problem.
There are two types of greenwashing: firm level greenwashing, in which companies make
misleading statements regarding the environmental practices of the companyor product-level greenwasing,
referring to the environmental benefits of one of its products or services. 12 Product-level greenwashing is
done through labeling and advertising, whereas firm-level greewashing is done through advertising and
public relations. Examples of firm-level greenwashing is General Electric’s “Ecomagination” campaign, in
which GE touted its work in the environmental arena while it simultaneously lobbied against new EPA clean
air requirements,13 or the massive environmental sustainability promises that Walmart makes, that somehow
never come to fruition.14 Illustrative examples of product-level greenwashing are LG Electronics and its
incorrectly-certified Energy Star refrigerators;15 “Audubon International”, a certifier of golf courses with
questionable standards that uses the well-known name and bird logo despite no affiliation with the Audubon

8

See United States Environmental Protection Agency, Assessing the Environmental Consumer Market 3 (1991).
Lane supra note 7, at 2-7
10
Id.
11
See Terrachoice Grp. Inc., The Sins Of Greenwashing: Home And Family Edition 6,11 (2010), available at
http://singsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2010 [hereinafter Terrachoice 2010] (finding that the consumer market for green
products and services was estimated at $230 billion in 2009 and predicted to grow to $845 billion by 2015 and that since 2009, the number of “green”
products has gone up by 73%).
12
See Terrachoice Environmental Marketing, The Seven Sins Of Greenwashing: Environmental Claims In Consumer Markets 1 (2009). Available at
http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2009/ [hereinafter Terrachoice 2009].
13
Magali A. Delmas & Vanessa Cuerel Burbano, The Drivers of Greenwashing, 2011 CAL. MGMT. REV. (2011) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1966721 (last visited May 15, 2014).
14
See generally Stacy Mitchell, Walmart’s Greenwash, Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR), (2012), available at http://www.ilsr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/03/walmart-greenwash-report.pdf; Drew Hudson, Report Don’t be Fooled 2014, The Green Life Online, available at
http://50.87.144.187/~grnlife/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/report-2.pdf. According to these reports, since Walmart launched its sustainability
campaign in 2005, it has yet to come close to any of the “goals” it set for itself, which includes being supplied 100% by alternative energy sources. In
fact, although it releases annual sustainability reports where they talk up test cases and reaffirm its promises, its own reporting says that its greenhouse
gas footprint has increased by 13.8% since 2005, less than 4% of its electricity comes from solar and wind sources as of March 2012, and ILSR
calculates that it would take approximately 300 years for Walmart to achieve its alternative energy goal at the current pace its going.
15
Eric L. Lane, Consumer Protection in the Eco-mark Era: A Preliminary Survey and Assessment of Anti-Greenwashing Activity and Eco-mark
Enforcement, 9 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 751-752 (2010). Energy Star, a government-backed third party eco-label indicating that a
product meets a set of energy efficiency guidelines, certified many of LG Electronics’ refrigerator models. It was discovered, however, that ten of the
certified LG refrigerator models had listed erroneous energy usage measurements on their labels and did not actually meet the efficiency standards
required to earn the certification. Id.
9

5

Society16; and Kashi’s use of “all Natural” on its cereal boxes, despite its use of genetically-modified
ingredients.17
Product-level greenwashing has been researched and documented more extensively than firm-level
greenwashing.18 For example, Gillespie identifies ten signs of greenwashing, ranging from “fluffy language,”
words or terms with no clear meaning such as “eco-friendly,” to “outright lying,” totally fabricated claims or
data.19 TerraChoice Environmental Marketing Inc. (“TerraChoice”), a marketing agency, published a report
which was based upon an analysis of thousands of products in the U.S. and Canada, initially called the “Six
Sins of Greenwashing” and later revised to include a seventh sin.20 Their initial report found that, of over
1,000 self-declared “green” products reviewed, all but one engaged in some form of greenwash by
committing at least one of the sins.21 TerraChoice’s 2010 reportfound that over 95% of “green” products
commit one or more of the seven sins.22 Per the TerraChoice report, committing a sin consists of making an
environmental claim that is either “demonstrably false” or misleading.23 For example, the “sin of the hidden
trade-off” consists of promoting one particular green attribute of a product while ignoring other aspects of
the product or its life cycle that either fail to benefit or actually harm the environment.24 Paper, for instance,
is not necessarily environmentally preferable just because it comes from a sustainably harvested forest.25
Other important environmental issues in the papermaking process, including energy, GHG emission, and
water pollution are just as significant, if not more.26 The “sin of no proof” occurs when a claim of
environmental benefit cannot be substantiated by the consumer through easily accessible information or by a
reliable third-party certification. An example is a tissue product that claims various percentages of postconsumer recycled content without providing any evidence.27
Greenwashing tends to result in several consequences. First and foremost, greenwashing is
misleading. Greenwashing deceives consumers by presenting firms as environmentally conscious when in
fact they have a questionable environmental track record, or by presenting products as having certain

16

Jeffgang, Greenwash Alert: Why is Audubon Endorsing Gold Courses?, THE GREEN LIFE BLOG (Nov. 15, 2012),
http://thegreenlifeonline.org/greenwash-alert-audubon-society-golf-courses/ (citing several articles on instances of confusion between the two.)
17
Katherine Bindley, Kashi GMO Use Creates Controversy, Backlash On Facebook And Twitter, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 27, 2012, 3:09 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/27/kashi-gmo-use-controversy_n_1456748.html
18
Delmas, supra note 13, at 6
19
Id.
(citing
Ed
Gillespie,
Stemming
the
Tide
of
Greenwash,
18
CONSUMER
POL'Y
REV.
79-83
(2008),
http://www.greenwashreport.org/downloads/stemming_the_tide_08.pdf).
20
See Terrachoice 2009, supra note 12
21
Id. at 3
22
See Terrachoice 2010, supra note 11
23
See Terrachoice 2009, supra note 12
24
Id at 3
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. There are other “sins.” The “sin of vagueness” is where a claim is either incorrectly defined or overly broad such that consumers cannot
understand what it means, e.g., “all natural” or “chemical free” products. The “sin of irrelevance” is where a claim may be true but is unimportant or
unhelpful, such as the claim that a product does not contain chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”), which were banned almost 30 years ago. The “sin of the
lesser of two evils” arises when a green claim may be true, but is made about a category of product that has an adverse environmental impact.
Examples are organic cigarettes or “green” herbicides. The “sin of fibbing” simply means that the claim is false and cannot be confirmed. The most
common example is products falsely claiming to be Energy Star certified. The “sin of worshipping a false label “is committed by a product that,
through either words or images, gives the impression of third-party endorsement where no such endorsement actually exists; fake labels, in other
words. Id.

6

characteristics when in fact they only have some or none of those attributes.28 By misdirecting consumer and
investor dollars, greenwashing in turn creates marketplace inefficiency.29
Greenwashing can also result in consumer and regulator complacency.30 “If one corporation in a
particular company gets away with greenwashing, other corporations will follow suit, thereby creating an
industry-wide illusion of environmental sustainability, rather than sustainability itself. This creation of the
illusion of environmental sustainability could have dire social consequences as consumers will continue to
use products and support companies that further environmental degradation and reduce the quality of living
conditions for future generations.” 31
Greenwashing may also promote consumer cynicism. “If consumers start to expect self-promoting
ads from even the most environmentally backwards corporations, or are bombarded by endless amounts of
green claims without any seeming credibility, this could make consumers skeptical the sincere portrayals of
legitimate corporate environmental achievements.” 32 Similarly, greenwashing can “negatively affect investor
confidence in environmentally friendly firms, eroding the socially responsible investing capital market.”33

III.

Combatting Greenwashing

Three broad categories of anti-greenwashing efforts currently exist; (1) regulatory solutions
(regulations and regulatory guidance), (2) social solutions (grassroot campaigns and blogs), and (3)
market-based solutions (independently certified eco-labels.) Each suffer from their own unique
problems, but all are weakened in some way by a lack of coordination and redundancy.
A. Regulation
Although a false advertising claim under the FTC’s consumer protection laws remains the primary
remedy against greenwashing, there are several other agencies and legal frameworks that are or can be
directly or indirectly used to combat the issue. An assortment of legal remedies is not, in it of itself a problem
-- in fact, it provides more avenues for consumers and government agencies to curb bad behavior. On the
other hand, given the often redundant differing standards and definitions among federal regulations and as
between federal and state regulations, greenwashing regulation also suffers from “too may hands in the
cookie pot,” making the task of crafting legitimate green claims highly confusing for companies.

1. The Federal Trade Commission
Section 5 and the Green Guides

28

See Terrachoice supra note 11, at 2
See generally Delmas, supra note 13.
30
Melissa Whellams and Chris MacDonald, What is Greenwashing, and Why is it a Problem?, BusinessEthics.ca,
http://www.businessethics.ca/greenwashing/ (citing Joel J. Davis, Ethics and Environmental Marketing, 11 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 81-87 (1992).).
31
Id.
32
Id. See also Terrachoice 2010 supra note 11, at 2
33
Delmas, supra note 13, at 3.
29
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The FTC Act is the main source of protection for consumers against false advertising.34 Although
Section 5 of the Act gives the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the power to prevent “unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce,”35 the FTC did not consider environmental marketing advertising
until the early late 1980s and early 1990’s when issues surrounding unclear environmental claims first gained
national attention.36 In response to the flurry of greenwashing, in July 1991, during the time that federal
legislation that would establish a national regulatory scheme for environmental marketing claims was being
proposed,37 and after being lobbied by the National Association of Attorneys General38 and industry
leaders,39 the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) hosted its first meetings to discuss environmental
marketing.40 Ultimately, no federal legislative action was taken,41 but a year later, the FTC released its first
Green Guides.42 The Green Guides suggest a series of general principles that apply to all environmental
marketing, and guidelines regarding specific terms, such as “biodegradable” or “recyclable,” with illustrative
examples throughout.43 However, the Green Guides themselves are not agency rules or regulations, but are
instead intended to set forth the FTC’s current view of the types of environmental claims the agency may
find deceptive under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.44 The language the FTC uses
emphasizes that these guides provide advice, not strictly enforced regulations.45
The Guides have been subject to a range of criticisms: unclear definitions, over generalized
principles, too few examples, and failing to set enforceable regulations.46 They were lightly revised in 1996

34

Glenn Israel, supra note 1, at 309-311 (1993)
15 U.S.C. § 45 (a)(1). Deceptive” is defined as “a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in
the circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.” United States Federal Trade Commission, FTC Policy Statement on Deception, Appended to
Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ftc-policy-statement-on-deception. Whether an advertising
claim constitutes a deceptive act or practice is determined through case-by-case prosecution, and prosecution under Section 5 can result in a fine or a
cease and desist order. FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A)–(B) (2006); U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Office of General Counsel, A Brief
Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority (2008), http://ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm [hereinafter
referred to as FTC Overview.] However, it does not confer a private right of action. See FTC Overview. Although the FTC has no expertise in
environmental issues, its power to prevent unfair methods of competition and deceptive acts in interstate commerce has been interpreted to include
misleading advertising for the last 70 years. Israel, supra note 1, at 303. See also Michelle Diffenderfer & Keri-Ann Baker, Greenwashing: What Your
Clients Should Know to Avoid Costly Litigation and Consumer Backlash. 25 AM. B. ASSOCIATION, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, (2011), available at
http://www.llw-law.com/files/presentations/NRE_win11_diffenderfer_baker%20(2).pdf.
36
See Ajay Menon and Anil Menon, Enviropreneurial Marketing Strategy: The Emergence of Corporate Environmentalism as Market Strategy, 61 J.
MKTG. 51, 52 (1997); David Gibson, Comment, Awash in Green: A Critical Perspective on Environmental Advertising, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 423,
428 (2009); Lauren C. Avallone, Comment, Green Marketing: The Urgent Need for Federal Regulation, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 685, 688 (2006).
37
During this period, the Senate proposed the Environmental Marketing Claims Act, authorizing the EPA to “create voluntary national guidelines for
environmental marketing terminology.” Kimberly C. Cavanagh, It’s A Lorax Kind of Market! But Is It A Sneetches Kind of Solution?: A Critical
Review of Current Laissez-Faire Environmental Marketing Regulation, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 160-161 (1998); Jamie Grodsky, Certified Green: The
Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 166 (1993).
38
The NAAG was composed of eight State Attorney Generals who formed an ad hoc task force and sponsored a public forum where forty different
organizations testified about standards for environmental advertising. This ultimately resulted in publication of The Green Report, and The Green
Report II. See Paul H. Luehr, Guiding the Green Revolution: The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Regulating Environmental Advertising, 10
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 314, 336 (1992).
39
See Israel, supra note 1, at 318
40
Gibson, supra note 36, at 429; Avallone, supra note 36, at 688.
41
See Cavanagh, supra note 37, at 133-144.
42
Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (Aug. 13, 1992) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260); Avallone, supra note
36, at 688.
43
16 C.F.R § 260.1(a)-(d) (2012). In the FTC’s own words, the “guidance” they provide includes: “1) general principles that apply to all
environmental marketing claims; 2) how consumers are likely to interpret particular claims and how marketers can substantiate these claims; and 3)
how marketers can qualify their claims to avoid deceiving consumers.” Id.
44
Id. at § 260.1(a)
45
Id. (“[The Guides] do not confer any rights on any person and do not operate to bind the FTC or the public.”).
46
Avallaone, supra note 36, at 686.
35
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and 1998, 47 but the criticisms were more directly addressed in the most recent 2012 revisions. Released on
October 1, 2012, the revised Green Guides include both updates to existing guidance and newly added
sections.48

Notable Cases
In recent years, the FTC has increased its enforcement activities regarding the advertising of green
products.49 This increased activity -- FTC complaints and warning letters – is based on existing laws and
rules such as the FTC Act, the Green Guides, the Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 15 U.S.C. § 70,
(Textile Act), and the Textile Rules, 16 C.F.R. pt. 303.50
For example, in late 2009, the FTC charged K-Mart, Tender Corp., and Dyna-E International with
making false and unsubstantiated statements by labeling and marketing paper products as “biodegradable.”51
The FTC alleged that the companies’ products were generally disposed of in landfills, incinerators and
recycling facilities that made the paper products impossible to biodegrade in a reasonable time. 52 Clothing
and textile companies were also charged with deceptive labeling and advertising.53 The FTC alleged that
these companies made false and unsubstantiated “green” claims by claiming that their textile products were
manufactured using an environmentally friendly process, that the products retained the natural antimicrobial
properties of the bamboo plant, and that the products were biodegradable.54 The FTC claimed that several
claims related to rayon clothing were being labeled as “100% bamboo fiber” and being marketed under
names such as “ecoKashmere,” “Pure Bamboo,” “Bamboo Comfort,” and “BambooBaby.”55 All companies
charged by the FTC entered into settlement agreements, barring them from making any of the claims they
had been, and from generally making any claims that were untrue.56 Then, in early 2010, pursuant to the
Textile Act and Rules, section 5 of the FTC Act, and the Green Guides, the FTC sent letters to seventy-eight

47

See 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311 (Oct. 11, 1996); 63 Fed. Reg. 24,240 (May 1, 1998); see also Sidley Austin, LLP, Revised FTC Guidance for Making
Environmental Benefit Claims, (Oct. 11 2012), http://www.sidley.com/Revised-FTC-Guidance-for-Making-Environmental-Benefit-Claims-10-112012/.
48
Id.
49
See Timothy C. Bradley, Likelihood of Eco-Friendly Confusion, LANDSLIDE, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 41, available at
http://www.coatsandbennett.com/images/pdf/Likelihood-of-Eco-Friendly-Confusion-Greenwashing-and-the-FTC-Green-Guides-by-TimothyBradley.pdf (noting several FTC actions based on the Green Guides since 2009, compared to zero such actions in the previous ten years);
Diffenderfer, supra note 35.
50
Diffenderfer, supra note 35.
51
In the Matter of Kmart Corp., A Corp.., C-4263, 2009 WL 2189691 (F.T.C. July 15, 2009); In the Matter of Tender Corp., C-4261, 2009 WL
4485637 (F.T.C. July 15, 2009); In the Matter of Dyna-E Int'l, Inc., A Corp., & George Wheeler, Individually & As an Officer of Dyna-E Int'l, Inc.,
9336, 2009 WL 4999726 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2009); see also Diffenderfer, supra note 35.
52
Id.
53
In the Matter of Pure Bamboo, LLC, A Ltd. Liab. Co., & Bruce Dear, Individually & As the Managing Member of the Ltd. Liab. Co.., C-4278,
2009 WL 4999713 (F.T.C. Dec. 15, 2009); In the Matter of Sami Designs, LLC, Also Doing Bus. As Jonano, A Ltd. Liab. Co., & Bonnie Siefers,
Individually & As Owner of the Ltd. Liab. Co., C-4275, 2009 WL 4999719 (F.T.C. Dec. 15, 2009); In the Matter of Cse, Inc., Also Doing Bus. As
Mad Mod, A Corp., & Chris Saetveit & Cyndi Saetveit, Individually & As Owners of the Corp.., C-4276, 2009 WL 4999708 (F.T.C. Dec. 15, 2009);
In the Matter of the M Grp., Inc Also Doing Bus. As Bamboosa & Mindy Johnson, Michael Moore, & Morris Saintsing, 149 F.T.C. 12 (2010); see
also Diffenderfer, supra note 35.
54
Id.
55
Press Release, United States Federal Trade Commission, FTC Charges Companies With "Bamboo-Zling' Consumers With False Product Claims,
2009 WL 2438333 (Feb. 3, 2010), available at www.ftc.gov/ opa/2010/02/bamboo.shtm; see also Diffenderfer, supra note 35.
56
Id.
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well-known companies57 with warnings that their respective advertisements could subject them to a public
enforcement action.58 The FTC warning letters arose over the companies’ alleged marketing practices of
labeling and advertising their rayon textile products as “bamboo.”59

Criticisms
While the creation and revisions of the Green Guides are admirable, common criticisms include: (1)
the guidelines are voluntary and thus do not have the force of law; (2) because the guidelines are voluntary,
they do not preempt state regulations which prevents a uniform standard; (3) the guidelines provide
extremely vague definitions and lack the specificity needed for scientific terminology; (4) the terminology is
limited and outdated, failing to reflect current environmental marketing trends; and (5) the guidelines have
failed to provide effective monitoring and enforcement.60
First, expanded Green Guides will continue to be non-binding guidance.61 Without binding guidance,
all environmental claims are still reviewed on a case-by-case basis using the section 5 “deceptive” standard;62
as a result, the FTC’s limited resources are put towards prosecuting only the most egregious and visible
violators and judges and jurors must make subjective determinations based on common sense or consumer
surveys. Additionally, non-binding guidelines do not preempt states’ individual regulations, resulting in a
lack of national uniformity in environmental regulations. Though several states have used the Guides as a
model when enacting regulation, other states have created their own stricter and more precise standards to
combat the perceived leniency of the Green Guides. State standards and definitions, however, vary greatly
among the states. 63 Manufacturers incur greater costs from this patchwork of standards, which can prevent
advertiser compliance.64
Another limitation of this regime is that the guidelines are subjective. The standards and terminology
defined in the Green Guides are vague mainly because they are not based on scientific technology, but rather
The companies that received the warning letters included: Amazon.com, Barney’s New York, Bed, Bath & Beyond, BJ’s Wholesale Club,
Bloomingdales, Costco Wholesale, Garnett Hill, Gold Toe, Hanes, Isotoner, JC Pen- ney, Jockey, K-Mart, Kohl’s, Land’s End, Macy’s, Maidenform,
Nordstrom, Overstock.com, QVC, REI, Saks Fifth Avenue, Sears, Shop NBC, Speigal, Sports Authority, Target, The Gap, the Great Indoors, Tommy
Bahama, Toys“R”Us, Wal-Mart, and Zappos.com. See Amazon.Com, Inc., Leon Max, Inc., Macy's, Inc., Sears, Roebuck And Co., Kmart
Corporation, Kmart.Com, Llc.—Court Complaints And Proposed Consent Decrees, FTC File Nos. 102 3132, 102 3126, 102 3129, 102 3127;
Announced January 3, 2013., 2013 WL 6144694; www.ftc.gov/os/2010/02/100203company- letter-recipients.pdf.
58
See Press Release, United States Federal Trade Commission, FTC Warns 78 Retailers, Including Wal-Mart, Target, and Kmart, to Stop Labeling
and Advertising Rayon Textile Products as "Bamboo" (Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2010/02/ftc-warns78-retailers-including-wal-mart-target-kmart-stop; see also United States Federal Trade Commission, FTC Business Alert: How to Avoid Bamboozling
Your Customers (Aug. 2009), available at www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/ pubs/business/alerts/alt172.shtm (FTC’s staff ’s interpretation of the Textile Act and
Rules); Diffenderfer, supra note 35.
59
Id. (all noting that products made of bamboo are generally considered environmentally friendly, whereas rayon is a manmade product fiber created
from plant-based cellulose and processed with chemicals that allegedly release harsh air pollutants).
60
Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1036-1043
61
Id at 1037-1038.
62
Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552, 63,552 (proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260) at nt.
44 (quoting FTC Policy Statement on Deception (“Deception Policy Statement”), appended to Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) )
63
For example, California, New York, and Rhode Island each define “recycled” differently. Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1040 (citing Grodsky, supra
note 37, at 164).
64
These include direct costs like printing new labels for each state and indirect costs such as maintaining two or more product inventories and
imposing separate distribution and record-keeping requirements for each state. Manufacturers must also monitor up to fifty independent standards,
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on how the FTC believes the advertisement will affect a consumer’s decision making. As a result,
manufacturers have often complained that they fail to provide “clear rules on what they may or may not
claim about their products. Instead, manufacturers are left to interpret the definitions and examples in
assessing whether their claims are valid.”65 Looking at past cases for guidance about environmental claims is
not that useful for manufacturers because each type of product has different considerations:66
Although case-by-case prosecution gives some guidance to future green marketers as to what the
FTC considers deceptive, it does not establish discernable marketing standards upon which green
marketers can dependably rely when marketing their own environmentally friendly products. Greenmarketing claims are unique in that each claim is made about a specific product with distinctive
properties, and each claim is judged by the effect it would have on a "reasonable consumer.” 67
Risk-adverse manufacturers may find the unclear definitions confusing and decide not to make
environmental claims in order to avoid false or misleading advertising.68 Second, the subjectivity provides
loopholes for manufacturers with average practices and products to apply eco-labels, which may prevent
manufacturers with environmentally superior practices from successfully differentiating their products.69
The range of currently existing environmental terms is enormous, and the Green Guides only define
a select few, even after the 2012 additions.70 The Guides remain over-generalized – while the updated Guides
provide clear definitions of what it means for claims to be “deceptive” or “substantiated,” it is difficult for
manufacturers to predict how the FTC will interpret things, because so few cases have been prosecuted under
either version of the Guides.71 Finally, the Guides have been criticized for being “simply out of touch with
current environmental marketing realities” given its failure to adequately respond to the emergence of new
technology and terminology. Although the 2012 revisions attempted to close the gap, another decade of no
revisions would mean the problem would persist.
The FTC’s case-by-case enforcement approach is also time consuming. Considering each case
individually makes it impossible to regulate all of the manufacturers making environmental claims about
hundreds of types of products.72 Perhaps not surprisingly, as of January 2010, the FTC had only prosecuted
thirty-seven green marketing claims.73 This relevant handful of cases is not nearly enough to cover all of the

65

Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1038-1039.
Id.
67
Robert B. White, Note, Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform Federal Marketing Definitions, 85 IND. L.J. 327-328 (2010)
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Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1038-1039; see also Avallone, supra note 36, at 686.
69
Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1038-1039; see also Sebastian Koos, Varieties of environmental labelling, market structures, and sustainable
consumption across Europe: A comparative analysis of organizational and market supply determinants of environmental-labelled goods, 34 J. OF
CONSUMER POL'Y 127-151 (2011); Grodsky, supra note 37, at 155-156 (“An unintended consequence of the FTC’s application of the reasonable
consumer standard is that it has essentially granted immunity in the gray area cases.”); see, e.g., Hill v. Roll Int’l Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109 (Ct.
App. 2011).
70
Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1043-44; see generally 16 C.F.R §§ 260.5-.17.
71
Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1043-44; see generally 16 C.F.R § 260.2 (advising that “relevant and reliable scientific evidence” should be used to
substantiate environmental claims); see also White, supra note 67, at 336 (“The FTC would need to prosecute a significant number of various
deceptive green-marketing claims to give the Green Guides sufficient context and provide marketers with well defined, predictable standards of what
it considers ‘deceptive.’ ”).
72
Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1042-43; see also Avallone, supra note 36, at 691.
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environmental claims a product could make, never mind all of the possible types of products.74 Another
problem with its incremental approach is that the FTC waits until after the false claims have been made
before taking action, rather than preventing false claims from being made in the first place and staying ahead
of the rapidly changing landscape of environmental marketing.75 Waiting until after environmental claims
have already misled many consumers is problematic: it creates consumer cynicism, takes market share away
from eco-labels making legitimate claims, and prevents the potential environmental benefits of purchasing
eco-labeled products. Moreover, because the FTC is limited to this case-by-case method due to legislation
restricting its ability to make rules addressing specific issues related to deceptive advertising,76 an ad-hoc and
discretionary enforcement pattern is left, with little precedential value.77 Further contributing to the FTC’s
lack of enforcement is the FTC’s unwillingness to pursue any action that might be seen as creating
environmental policy.78 Finally, the fact that injured consumers lack standing is also troublesome – without
standing to sue, consumers must wait for the FTC to act or for a competing business to bring claims under
the Lanham Act.79
The Green Guides are clearly a step in the right direction. It’s also clear that the FTC will continue to
use the FTC Act and the Green Guides, independently and in combination with other federal laws and rules,
to bring public enforcement claims against companies making greenwashed claims about their products or
the environmental attributes of their products.80 It is possible that because of the clearer, bolder guidelines in
the 2012 Green Guide revisions, the FTC will increase its enforcement efforts and gain traction, especially
since the Guide is based on a consumer-based survey of consumer beliefs about the meaning of typical green
claims.81 The revisions may also make businesses equip themselves with their own data on consumer
understandings of green claims. Additionally, companies may benefit by policing competitors using
deceptive advertising; companies will likely rely on the guidelines to bolster their position in Lanham Act
claims or in proceedings before the National Advertising Division. However, the need for clarity and
consistency, precisely what spurred the FTC to publish the Green Guides in the first place, has prompted
Id.; see also Tom Redick, Regulatory Update – FTC Seeks Input on Green Marketing Guides, 26 AGRICULTURAL L. UPDATE 1,4 (2009)
Tawnya Wojciechowski, Comment, Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An Argument for Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standing
for False Advertising Under Lanham Act Section 43(a), 24 SW. U. L. REV. 231 (1994) (using environmental marketing as an example of the FTC’s
ineffectiveness)
76
Howard Barnett, Green with Envy: The FTC, the EPA, the States, and the Regulation of Environmental Marketing, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 491,495 (1995);
see 15 U.S.C. § 57 a (a)(2) (2006)
77
See Grodsky, supra note 37, at 155 (calling case by case enforcement “selective, incremental, and highly contextual.”)
78
Fliegelman, supra note 6, at 1043 (citing to News Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Actions Against Kmart, Ten- der and Dyna-E
Alleging Deceptive ‘Biodegradable’ Claims (June 9, 2009), available at www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/kmart.shtm.) Fliegelman also notes that at the
FTC’s January 2008 workshop, FTC Chairman Majoras stated that despite the Commission’s intent to explore these scientific issues, she “want[ed] to
make clear that [the FTC] [does not] . . . have the authority or the technical expertise to ad- dress issues of environmental or energy regulation,”
(citing to Deborah Majoras, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fed. Trade Comm’n’s Workshop on Carbon Offsets and
Renewable Energy Certificates 16 (Jan. 8. 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/carbonoffsets/transcript/opening_ dpmajoras.pdf)
and that during July 2009 congressional hearings, James Kohm, the Associate Director of the Enforcement Division in the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer
Protection at the time, reiterated that any marketing modifications must avoid “set[ting] environmental standards or policy,” because the
Commission’s only purpose is to “protect[] consumers from unfair or deceptive practices.” Id; see also Valerie Davis, FTc on Greenwashing: Is That
All There Is?, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (June 20 2009), http://www.environmentalleader.com/2009/06/20/ftc-on-greenwashing-is-that-all-there-is/
79
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many scholars to suggest that a new regulatory framework that creates uniform national standards is what’s
needed.82
2. EPA
83

84

Both the House and the Senate proposed legislation that would have given the EPA differing
degrees of authority to regulate environmental marketing terminology; however, these legislative efforts did
not succeed, preventing the EPA from having either exclusive or joint authority to address green marketing.85
The first FTC Green Guides were created in conjunction with the EPA in 1998,86 however, since then the
EPA has been significantly less involved in addressing greenwashing. Currently, the EPA is the chief
enforcement agency for five main areas that involve greenwashing,87 and in each of these areas, the Agency
has promulgated labeling regulations.88 The most notable is its creation of the most prominent governmentbacked environmental labeling program in the United States, the ENERGY STAR Program, which lends a
stamp of approval to electronic products that achieve certain levels of energy efficiency.89 Not to be confused
with the FTC/DOE Energy Guide label,90 the blue-and-white Energy Star label is a voluntary program
available to a much broader range of products than just appliances, including buildings, identifying the
product carrying it as more efficient than most of its peers.91 Energy Star labels have been criticized for
remaining on products that no longer qualify for updated standards.92
The EPA also sets mandatory vehicle emissions and fuel economy standards. The Energy Policy and
Conservation Act established corporate average fuel economy (“CAFE”) standards, which require that all
new light-duty vehicles sold in the U.S. must bear a label indicating the estimated miles-per-gallon rate (fuel
economy) for city and highway use.93 NHTSA, an agency within the U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT), administered the original CAFE program while the EPA was responsible for establishing the testing

82

See Thomas C. Downs, Comment, “Environmentally Friendly” Product Advertising: Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 AM. U. L.

REV. 185-193(1992); Avallone, supra note 36, at 694-695; Israel, supra note 1, at 325
83

Environmental Marketing Claims Section of the National Waste Reduction, Recycling, and Management Act (the Swift Act), H.R. 3865, 102d
Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992); See Israel, supra note 1, at 323-326; see generally Downs, supra note 82
84
Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991 (the Lautenberg Act), S. 615 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); See Israel, supra note 1, at 323-326; see
generally Downs, supra note 82.
85
See K. Alexandra McClure, Comment, Environmental Marketing: A Call for Legislative Action, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1351, 136162 (1995)
86
In order to address the issue of federal uniformity, the staff from the EPA, White House Office of Consumer Affairs, and the FTC met as part of the
Interagency Task Force on Environmental Marketing Claims to develop these guidelines. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Status Report
on the Use of Environmental Labels Worldwide, EPA 742-R-9-93-001 (1993); See also U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Guidance for the Use
of the Terms “Recycled” and “Recyclable” and the Recycling Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,992 (Oct. 2, 1991).
87
The five main areas are: (1) compliance with vehicle emissions standards; (2) placement of warning labels on ozone-detrimental products; (3)
participation in the national recycling and emissions reduction program; (4) elimination of nonessential products con- taining chlorofluorocarbons;
and (5) greenhouse gas emissions. See Cavanagh, supra note 37, at 164-165
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United States Environmental Protection Agency, ENERGY STAR and Other Climate Protection Partnerships: 2011 Annual Report (2012),
available at http://www.energystar.gov/ia/partners/publications/pubdocs/2011_AnnualReport_Final_low-res_12-13-12.pdf [hereinafter called
ENERGY STAR].
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16 C.F.R. §305 (1987)
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See supra note 89
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Jonathan Wiener, Unplugged: Energy labels Underestimate Appliance Costs, EARTHJUSTICE BLOG (May 09, 2011), http://earthjustice.org/blog/2011may/unplugged-energy-labels-underestimate-appliance-costs; What the EnergyGuide label doesn’t tell you, CONSUMER REPORTS MAGAZINE (Mar.
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and evaluation protocol for assessing compliance and calculating the fuel economy for each manufacturer.
However, after the landmark Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,94 which gave the EPA a
mandate to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, and the National Fuel Efficiency Policy announced by
President Obama on May 19, 2009,95 the EPA created greenhouse gas emissions standards under the Clean
Air Act. Because authority to set CAFE standards rests with the NHSTA, in an effort to avoid creating two
sets of standards, NHTSA and EPA worked together to ensure that greenhouse gas regulations on vehicles
coordinated with CAFE standards, creating a new, harmonized National Program under which automobile
manufacturers will be able satisfy all requirements under both programs.96 Failure of a manufacturer to meet
the average standards would ultimately result in the potential for monetary penalties under both EPCA and
the CAA.
The EPA has also taken a few indirect approaches to curb greenwashing. Pursuant to Executive
Order (EO) 13101, entitled "Greening the Government through Waste Prevention, Recycling and Federal
Acquisition," under which the EPA is required to develop guidance to "address environmentally preferable
purchasing," the EPA issued its Final Guidance on Environmentally Preferable Purchasing to help executive
agencies meet their 13101 obligations to identify and purchase environmentally preferable products and
services.97 It also developed its Green Purchasing Guides 98 and the Database of Environmental Information
for Products and Services99 to further assist in the green government procurement effort. The EPA
recognizes organizations, programs, and individuals that “significantly advance green power development”
in its annual Green Power Leadership Awards, jointly sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
and Center for Resource Solutions (CRS). While intended to be an incentive to companies to make legitimate
claims, the program has been criticized for promoting “something-is-better-than-nothing sustainability.” 100
In addition, the EPA has participated in the International Standards Organization’s (ISO) efforts to
standardize eco-label criteria on a global scale.101

94

U.S. 497 (2007)
Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces National Fuel Efficiency Policy, (May 19, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/president-obama-announces-national-fuel-efficiency-policy
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Because of its environmental expertise, many scholars have advocated for increased EPA
involvement, suggesting that the EPA is the more preferable agency over the FTC altogether,102 or that a
collaborative effort between the FTC and the EPA would be most effective regulatory scheme.103
3. National Advertising Division
Another false advertising remedy is a proceeding before the National Advertising Division (NAD),
the advertising industry’s self-regulating body.104 NAD cases can be initiated through staff monitoring of
advertising claims105 or through “challenges” to advertising claims filed by competitors106, consumers, or
public interest groups.107 Compliance with NAD decisions is voluntary, but advertisers that either refuse to
participate in the self-regulatory process or do not implement the NAD recommendations are referred to the
government.108 The NAD uses the Green Guides to evaluate disputes between competitors about the legality
of environmental marketing claims.109
4. Private Actions Under Federal Law
In addition to FTC enforcement actions and EPA regulations, companies can also face civil litigation
from private parties such as consumers and competitors under federal law.110 For example, in Paduano v.
American Honda Motor Company,111 a consumer brought a claim for alleged violations of the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act112 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.113 These actions can be brought in state
or federal court.114
Businesses may bring suit under the Lanham Act.115 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes civil
liability against “[a]ny person who . . . uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device . . . which
102

See Downs, supra note 82, at 155, 172–80 (proposing a new program of green claims regulation under the jurisdiction of the EPA due to its
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104
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. . . in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic
origin of…goods, services, or commercial activities.” 116 The standard almost mirrors the “deceptive”
standard under the FTC Act.117 Contrary to the FTC Act, which is only enforceable by the FTC, the Lanham
Act provides for a private cause of action.118 However, for the most part, only parties with commercial or
competitive interests have standing under 43(a), and thus consumers are excluded.119 The Act, though it does
not specifically address green marketing, has in some cases been an effective tool for companies seeking to
root out greenwashing by their competitors.120
Similar to section 43(a)’s general prohibition of false and misleading advertising, section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act bars the registration of deceptive trademarks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO).121 The USPTO has generally treated environmental terms such as “organic,” “sustainable,” and
“natural” as potentially deceptive when attributed to products that do not fit the bill.122 However, unlike
43(a), which provides damages and injunctive relief, 123 companies barred under 2(a) are only denied the
benefits of trademark registration – their marketing strategies are not otherwise scrutinized.124
5. State Law
At the state level, there are private consumer actions under state law or federal law,125 as well as
individual and coordinated state agency and state attorney general enforcement actions.126 In private court
actions, the plaintiff can be an individual,127 but are more often consumer class actions,128 and typically
116

Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). A successful claim generally proves five elements: 1) [T]he defendant has made false or
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allege either that the advertised environmental benefits of the product itself are false or misleading129, or that
the brand owner misrepresented its own green certification program as that of an independent, objective third
party.130
Every state has its own general consumer protection laws that are similar to section 5 of the FTC
Act, hence called “little FTC Acts.131 Each state uses state common law or FTC regulations and FTC cases to
define “unfair” and “deceptive” rather than defining the terms in the acts themselves, and therefore are
susceptible to the same advantages and disadvantages as the FTC Act.132 However, there is one notable
exception -- while only the FTC can bring claims under the federal statutes, many of these corresponding
state laws provide consumer standing.133 Additionally, several states have enacted laws specifically aimed at
misleading environmental marketing,134 which usually fall under one of three main categories:135 (1)
comprehensive definitional statutes,136 (2) market-oriented regulations,137 or (3) adoption of the FTC’s Green
Guides.138 Further, it is likely that plaintiffs could bring claims under unfair business practices and unfair
competition laws,139 as well as common-law claims, including, but not limited to, fraudulent
misrepresentation,140 breach of warranty,141 and unjust enrichment claims.142
6. Other Enforcement Options on the Horizon
This section describes several other legal frameworks that, though untested, may be effective tools to
challenge greenwashing.

Federal Securities Fraud: 10b-5
One possible avenue is a 10b-5 claim by investor alleging, for example, that a corporation
intentionally made a material misstatement or actionable omission about its environmental behavior, which
the investor relied on in choosing to invest in the company, and as a result of the fraudulent statement, the
corporation suffered a PR nightmare of the sort Chevron did, or got slapped with a costly FTC enforcement
128
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action, causing damages to the investor in the form of lower returns.143 The primary challenge to success
with this approach is proving materiality.144 Even if the investor could successfully point to the false
statement, the statement might be deemed “immaterial as a matter of law on the ground that it is meaningless
hyperbolic puffery.”145 Another, smaller difficulty is demonstrating causation.146 As applied to a BP or
Chevron, the investor would have to prove not only that it was motivated to buy or sell their stock on the
basis of the companies environmental claim, but also that the stock subsequently fell because it did not live
up to its environmental claim.147 It is also possible that U.S. securities laws, as part of their requirement to
disclose ‘material’ information on publicly traded corporations, could eventually require the inclusion of a
corporation’s status as being third party certified with respect to the claims and labels placed on their
products.148

U.S. Dodd-Frank Act
The newly enacted Dodd-Frank Act149 may provide a basis for policing greenwashing. Section 1011
of the Act enables the creation of a Bureau of Consumer Financial protection to “regulate the offering and
provision of consumer financial products or services under the Federal consumer financial laws.” 150 As
Cherry & Sneirson explain:
The statutory language concerning consumer education, appropriate disclosure, and tracking of
consumer complaints could overlap with…greenwashing, as these are consumer-information issues
and accurate disclosure could certainly influence consumers’ informed investment decisions.
Further, educating consumers about their rights should include helping consumers understand
whether their purchases will advance the causes they believe in. That can only be done through
accurate disclosure. As the legislation and the Bureau are still so new, it is difficult to know how the
various provisions will be enforced and what litigation they will generate.151
Civil RICO Suits
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Civil RICO suits are another, albeit rarely used, avenue.152 The Rackateer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) makes it illegal for any person to conduct an enterprise that affects interstate
commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity,153 or to invest racketeering income in a business that
affects interstate commerce.154 The statute has a list of crimes that constitute racketeering activities155, the
ones relevant to deceptive green marketing being mail fraud and wire fraud.156 The plaintiff would claim that
the advertiser committed mail or wire fraud by deceptively advertising a product.157 At least as of the mid1990’s, citizen attempts to prosecute false advertising and deceptive green claims under RICO had not been
successful, as “lower courts [were] reluctant to allow civil RICO actions to proliferate in these nontraditional areas.” 158 Even so, the possibility that a plaintiff could prevail in a civil RICO claim concerning a
particularly outrageous case of false advertising is something for manufacturers to be mindful of, as RICO
liability results in expensive consequences.159
B. Environmental Watchdogs and Grassroots Campaigns
In addition to regulatory schemes, private organizations and environmental activists act as
greenwashing “watchdogs,” policing corporate greenwashers on the internet, social media, and mainstream
media. Since the rise of greenwashing, organizations like TerraChoice,160 Greenpeace,161 and the Center for
Environmental Health162 have monitored the problem and brought it to the public’s attention. A successful
example of watchdog policing of firm-level greenwashing is the spoofing of Chevron’s “we agree”
campaign, launched just few months after the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, in the wake of public
backlash at BP and oil companies in general, and four months before Chevron was hit with a $9.5-billion
judgment in a long-running lawsuit alleging that the company was responsible for poisoning the Ecuadorian
rainforest.163 The campaign involved a series of advertisements agreeing with the public sentiment, affirming
its commitment to renewable energy by “agreeing” that it needed to develop affordable, viable alternatives to
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fossil fuels, and inviting critics to learn the company’s position on environmental issues.164 But the campaign
did not sit well with many people.165 So much so that three organizations166 embarked on a parody series of
“we agree” ads and press releases that went viral,167 spoofing the campaign so well that many news outlets
thought they were authentic.168 And the negative press did not stop there; The True Cost of Chevron
Network, a coalition of about 40 environmental watchdogs, authored an annual report called the “Alternative
Annual Report”, an “alternative” to Chevron’s annual report, which brings together stories from communities
across the world that are all directly affected by and in struggle against Chevron’s operations and details the
“true costs” paid for Chevron’s profits.169 It also released its own series of advertisements in response to
Chevron’s campaign that aims to depict the reality for the communities and environments impacted by
Chevron.170
Another notable firm-level watchdog success is www.greenwashingindex.com,171 which enables
individuals to post and rate the extent to which environmental ads are greenwashing attempts. Successful
examples of policing of product-level greenwashing are indexing websites such as ecolabelindex.com,172
greenerchoices.org,173 ConsumerReport’s eco-label database,174 and NRDC’s Label Lookup,175 which
aggregate and provide independent verification and analysis of environmental logos and labels that purport to
communicate that products have met environmental standards. A great example of social media’s impact on
greenwashing is around Kashi’s “all natural” greenwash. A few months after farm policy watch-dog
organization the Cornucopia Institute released a report called "Cereal Crimes," alleging that the "all-natural"
cereal brand Kashi uses genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in some of its products, a small health foods
grocery store in Rhode Island discovered the news and pulled the cereal off its shelves.176 It then posted a
picture of Kashi’s “all natural” shelf sign on its Facebook page, creating a viral backlash against Kashi across
the web and prompting the need for Kashi to do serious damage control.177 This eventually forced Kashi to
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carry 7 cereals with the Non-GMO Project Verified seal.178
Due to these types of successful watchdog efforts, “notable transgressions and false claims instantly
reach millions of concerned consumers through the green blogosphere”,179 an “unorganized but
interconnected network”180 of providers of green products and services, government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, certifying organizations, green news organizations, green search engines, social
networks, “trendspotter” web sites such as TreeHugger, advocacy groups, bloggers and green lifestyle
movements.181 Green marketing expert Richard Seireeni has coined this phenomenon “The Gort Cloud.”182
Messages can spread through the network and create a PR nightmare for a company that engages in
greenwashing and attach long-lasting stigma.183 A quote from a strategic communications professional in
Advertising Age explains why this is not like what a pesky fly is to a horse: "It's like a thumb trap, the more
the company tries to defend itself, the more it becomes part of the story and that makes it more interesting.
The company being attacked can't effectively fight back itself and that's why these tactics are so effective."184
These watchdog efforts, while not enough to put an end to false environmental claims (largely due to their
unorganized nature),185 are a powerful policing tool – a 2013 survey by Cone Communications revealed that
78% of consumers would actively boycott any company that was found to be intentionally making
misleading claims about their environmental stewardship.186
C. Eco-Labels
The modern day concept of labeling consumer products has been in existence for some time. In the late
1890s, the Underwriters Laboratory Seal, which rates the safety of electrical equipment, became the first
official U.S. product label.187 Today, product labeling comes in various forms, such as the Good
Housekeeping Seal, Consumer Reports, automobile mileage statements, and pesticide warning labels. While
these labels govern different types of claims and different kinds of products, they all have the effect of
providing the customer with readily available information on particular characteristics of a product.
Likewise, an environmental label identifies a product that meets a wide range of environmental performance
criteria or standards. According to the EPA, “environmental labeling is defined as making relevant
environmental information available to the appropriate consumers.”188 The “environmental information” is
178
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presented in a variety of formats. Some labels are simply a word or phrase, commonly printed and circled in
green, like “eco-friendly.” Other labels contain a picture and text, such as the Forest Stewardship Council’s
eco-label, which features a symbol that combines a checkmark and a tree above the initials “FSC.”189
Environmental labels can be divided between first-party efforts, claims (“green” and “biodegradable”) and
labels (self-developed standards and seal of approval) made by the manufacturer itself, and third-party labels,
which are developed, certified, and licensed by an independent entity, such as a government agency or
private organization.190
As discussed earlier, environmental marketing claims, and therefore greenwashing conduct, typically
take one of two forms.191 Companies either portray themselves as responsible stewards of the environment by
touting their sustainable business practices or moralities (firm-level greenwashing), or the environmental
advertising is associated with particular goods (product level greenwashing), such as energy efficient
appliances or biodegradable diapers.192 Firm level greenwashing often comes in the form of touting of
Environmental Management Systems (EMS), which certifies that a system is in place in the organization to
keep track of the environmental performance, or social labeling (e.g, “we are committed to using renewable
energy sources”).193 On the other hand, product-level greenwashing usually takes the form of first party
“environmental labeling.”194
The 1980s was plagued by a widespread product-level greenwashing—with surveys indicating
widespread consumer confusion and skepticism over the alleged claims.195 As these claims soared, so did the
demand for better evidence of claims, and – consequently – the demand for third party endorsement.196
Privately-developed, voluntary environmental product standards and certifications, otherwise known as “ecolabels,” emerged to fill the void created by the lack of government regulations and national standards, acting
as a market-based tool for combatting greenwashing197 as far back as the 1980s,198 with Germany’s Blue
Angel Program recognized as the first eco-label program.199 Private certifying organizations typically license
their environmental label mark or logo to those who meet their developed standards, permitting the
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manufacturer to display the mark on products and in advertisements, usually in exchange for a licensing
fee.200
1. Classification of Environmental Labels
In everyday language, “eco-labels” is often used to refer to all product labels that make a “green”
claim, however, eco-label is a subsidiary of a large and composite family that should be referred to as
“environmental labels.” Eco-labels are just a type of environmental label, with a certain level of
comprehensiveness, independence and reliability. There are four general points of differentiation: (1)
whether the scheme is mandatory or voluntary; (2) whether the label is first party, made by the
manufacturer/retailer itself, or third party, whereby the label’s standards are set, certified, and licensed to
companies by an independent entity; (3) whether that independent entity is a government agency or a private
organization; and (4) whether the label is “single attribute” or “multi-criteria.”201 To the extent that this paper
mentions “eco-labels,” it is in reference to voluntary, third party labeling programs, licensed by either the
government or a private entity. However, a discussion of the various types of environmental labels remains
helpful in understanding the anti-greenwashing landscape.
Mandatory environmental labeling refer to labels required by law; these appear to be more common
for specific, single-attribute performance issues such as water or energy consuming devices.202 These
standards are usually developed by the government.203 Mandatory labels include danger symbols, conformity
with standards, declaration of contents, national rating schemes, and research & testing institutions.204 The
goal of either type of mandatory labeling scheme is to provide to the consumer reliable product information
which might not otherwise be disclosed, and to encourage manufacturers to improve product design so as to
achieve more than the minimum required efficiency.205
Mandatory “Negative Content” labels are all government labels requiring the labeling of any good
that contains an environmentally harmful substance, or was produced utilizing an environmentally harmful
substance or method.206 For example, in the U.S., section 611 of the federal Clean Air Act requires the
labeling of any product that contains or was manufactured with certain chemical substances known to deplete
the stratospheric ozone layer, such as “CFCs”.207
Mandatory “Content Neutral” labeling schemes refer to instances in which certain products must be
labeled in order to disclose information to the consumer that the government has determined to be of
importance.208 This information may or may not reveal negative facts about the product.209 Notable examples
200
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are the FTC/DOE’s Energy Guide label, and the EPA/DOT fuel economy and emissions standards discussed
earlier.210 Under the FTC’s “Energy Guide” system, regulated jointly by the FTC and the Department of
Energy (DOE), certain home appliances must bear a label indicating their respective energy efficiency
ratings.211 It is a yellow-and-black sticker or hang tag that tells consumers the estimated annual energy use
and operating costs of new household appliances, and is legally required to be on refrigerators, freezers,
dishwashers, washing machines, room air conditioners, water heaters and other products.212 Among other
things, it also includes a comparison scale that consumers can use to judge a product against similar
models.213 The label is often criticized for conveying outdated information that makes products appear
misleadingly efficient relative to others.214 Although the FTC recently updated the assumed utility rates and
the comparison scales to address this,215 the issues will plague the Energy Guide as long as the agency waits
five years between each update.216 It has also been criticized for being easily confused with, and redundant
to, EPA’s Energy Star standards (discussed earlier), which is a voluntary label.217 The U.S. Department of
Agriculture’s (USDA) “organic” certification standards is yet another example. The USDA strictly regulates
the use of the word “organic.” 218 The Organic Foods Production Act (OFPA) specifically prohibits the
marketing of domestic agricultural products as organically produced, except in conformity with the USDA’s
national standards.219 The law also limits the use of the USDA seal to products that meet the organic
certification requirements.220 OFPA’s accompanying National Organic Program (NOP) lays out the USDA’s
particular standards for organic certification. 221
Voluntary labels, on the other hand, vary significantly. First party labels are claims made by the
manufacturer or retailer of the product itself – most U.S. regulations have focused on curbing these types of
labels because they often constitute greenwashing.222 Third party labels are those that either certify that first
party claims by manufacturers are valid, or develop the label’s standards themselves and license the ability to
use the label on their products upon certification of compliance with the standards.223 These third parties can
mean that the scheme is government-sponsored or is operated solely by a private, third party certification
organization.224 “Single issue” labels are those that focus on a single sector (e.g. the forestry industry, the
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chemical industry), and/or address only one environmental issue (e.g. air quality, energy conservation),
and/or consider only a single life cycle phase in their applications (e.g. product use, product
disposal/recycling).225 “Multi-criteria” labeling schemes, on the other hand, exist in two formats: the “seal of
approval” scheme, and the content neutral, “report card” scheme.226 Seal of approval programs seek to award
the use of a logo to a manufacturer based on the independent judgment of the comparable environmental
impacts of products.227 A report card, on the other hand, differs in that it does not generally judge which
criteria are most important in assessing the environmental impact of a product – it’s akin to the nutritional
label found on many packaged foods.228 While a “seal of approval” will only be given to a product that
“passes the test,” report cards can be given to a product regardless of its environmental impact.229 The report
card also gives a greater amount of information and therefore promotes consumer autonomy. 230
Combinations of all four attributes exist among the labeling schemes.
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has identified three broad types of voluntary
labels,231 Type I, Type II,232 and Type III,233 plus a fourth informal type, Type I-like. Although differing in
strength and effectiveness, the different label types have been identified by the ISO as sharing a common
goal, which is: "...through communication of verifiable and accurate information that is not misleading on
environmental aspects of products and services, to encourage the demand for and supply of those products
225
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and services that cause less stress on the environment, thereby stimulating the potential for market-driven
continuous environmental improvement."234
Type I labels are what are commonly referred to as eco-labels, and are the most common and
promising form of market-based anti-greenwashing efforts.235 They are “voluntary, multiple-criteria-based,
third-party program that awards a license that authorizes the use of environmental labels on products
indicating overall environmental preference of a product within a particular product category based on life
cycle,”236 and are generally the “seal of approval” type of label.237 Beyond ISO, there is also an informal
fourth group, “Type I-like,” which has a verification and certification process similar to that of Type I ecolabels, and are therefore also “seals of approval,” but focus on single issues (e.g, energy consumption,
sustainable forestry, etc.) rather than labeling a variety of product categories.238
In the U.S., a leading example of a private Type I “seal of approval” eco-label is Green Seal.239 In
terms of governmental Type-I labels, at the federal level, the most notable example is EPA’s ENERGY
STAR program, which, as previously discussed, is a government-backed voluntary eco-label indicating that a
product meets a set of energy efficiency guidelines.240 At the state level, New York law creates official
recycling emblems for voluntary use, enabling companies to market their products using the state-certified
logo only after meeting strict standards based on the product and the type of environmental claim. 241 Good
examples of private Type I-like labels (single attribute eco-labels) are the United States Green Building
Council’s (“USGBC”) Leadership in Energy & Environmental Design (“LEED”) green building system,242
and the Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) certification standards for sustainable timber,243 discussed
below.
Because Type II labels are, practically speaking, one of the primary forms of greenwashing, and
because Type III labels have yet to become widely used, the remainder of this paper will focus on Type I
eco-labels.

2. Eco-Labels 101
Process and Structure
In general, eco-labels consist of three main components: (1) selection and determination of product
categories, (2) development and adoption of appropriate criteria, standards, or guidelines, and (3)
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certification and licensing.244
Although there is some variation in their administrative structure, most legitimate “seal of approval”
programs follow the same process. First, they require an independent, voluntary consensus entity, which can
take the form of a formal standard setting organization (SSO), a trade/industry association, or a governmental
entity.245 Multiple stakeholder participation representing a variety of social and economic interests is usually
present, to varying degrees, in a typical “seal of approval” eco-labeling program, including: (1) government,
(2) program managers, (3) industry and commercial associations, retailers and companies, (4) consumers,
and (5) other interested parties, including academic experts, media, NGO’s and consumer groups.246
Assuming the organization has been created and/or program manager have obtained the necessary
stakeholders, the organization then selects the product categories to be certified, determining which products
are eligible and the stringency of the certification criteria.247 Batteries, for example, will be treated differently
depending on whether all batteries are considered rather than only rechargeable ones.248 A typical approach is
to group products that routinely perform the same function.249 Proposals for categories are generally accepted
from any source, but in practice,
most proposals arise from industry, or internally from the program managers. Trade, consumer,
environmental and other public organizations can also request consideration of specific categories.
After formal review, often with technical advisory groups, selections are then made. Most programs
also have some guiding principles to assist in selection... [which] often include the environmental
impact of the product, the degree of differentiation between products within the proposed category,
and the importance of the product in the marketplace.250
Next, to differing degrees, some version of product life-cycle analysis (LCA) is performed, which
determines environmental costs and impacts “from the cradle to the grave.”251 A complete LCA consists of
three stages: an inventory analysis, impact analysis, and improvement analysis.252 Inventory analysis
attempts to identify and quantify the major raw material and energy inputs and environmental releases that
occur at different points along a product's life cycle, from the extraction and processing of raw materials,
through the manufacturing process, transportation and distribution stage, use and maintenance stage, the
recycling process (if possible), to the final disposition of the product.253 The EPA defines “impact analysis”
as “a systematic process to identify, characterize, and value potential ecosystem, human health, and natural
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resource impacts associated with the inputs and outputs of a product or process system.”254 Essentially, this
stage evaluates the significance of the quantitative results of the inventory stage.255 The last stage,
“improvement analysis,” entails determining whether any of the negative environmental impacts can be
reduced through product or process redesign.256
The differentiating parameters (e.g. energy use, toxicity, etc.) from the LCA are then used to develop
the criteria and standards.257 “Technical and scientific specialists, generally from both government and the
private sector, prepare draft criteria that are then made available to interested parties for consideration and
feedback. Comments are received and reviewed by program staff, technical experts or an advisory group, and
are reflected when appropriate in the final criteria.”258
When certification standards/criteria are established, applicants that want to participate in an ecolabeling program (e.g., manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, importers, retailers) make an application and
submit their products for certification under the program, which usually must include technical
information.259 This certification can be done by the SSO itself, or a certifier independent of the SSO. In
addition, the implementation body might also direct and/or perform an on-site audit or inspection.260 “In
some cases, independent verification is performed by the program, and in others, a declaration by the
applicant is accepted on the assumption that competitors or environmental groups will notify program
officials if there is a suspicion that inaccurate information has been provided.”261 Applicants also typically
pay application and certification fees. 262
Usually, the eco-label is either awarded or not awarded (pass/fail), but some labels are tiered with the
eco-label displaying information on the relative performance of the company, and some labels provide a
combination of both.263 Once the applicant is licensed264 to use the label on, or in association with, its
certified product(s) or service, an annual fee is charged for use of the eco-label for a specific period of
time.265 Use of the eco-label is restricted to the approved product(s), and is usually monitored/periodically
reviewed by the SSO or independent certifier for continued compliance.266
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Example: LEED and FSC
The green building movement began in the 1990’s as a private sector initiative.267 In the U.S., the
federal and state governments were not involved, and instead the US Green Building Council (USGBC) and
other private entities became the source for “green” building guidance. The USGBC is a Washington, D.C.based non-profit organization, comprised of 78 local affiliates, more than 20,000 member companies and
organizations, and more than 100,000 LEED-accredited professions.268 In 1998, in the absence of
government issued standards, the USGBC created the first version of LEED, a voluntary, consensus-based
system that rates the environmental impact of buildings.269
The LEED program is a rating system measures a building’s green features, comprised of several
different certification tracks including New Construction (NC), Existing Buildings: Operations and
Maintenance (EB: O&M), Commercial Interiors (CI), Core and Shell (CS), Homes (H), and Neighborhood
Development (ND).270 A governing committee established by the USGBC creates requirements for
certification through a template that distributes points into several categories based on consensus-based
sustainable practices.271 The points assigned to each category create a weighting system for the different
attributes and lay out minimum standards for compliance.272 A project receives certification when it
demonstrates that all of the points earned in each of the different categories at least meet the thresholds
established by the committee.273 The LEED program also provides additional recognition options, noted as
Silver, Gold, or Platinum, when a project attains higher point totals than required for basic certification.274
First, an applicant must register the project and pay a registration fee.275 Eventually, as the design
and construction process moves along, the applicant applies for LEED certification and technical review.276
When an applicant submits its plan for this review, the verification process requires documents, attestations,
data, and other information that supports compliance with each point applied toward the total needed for
certification.277 After a final review, there is a determination as to the certification, level awarded, or denial
of overall certification or individual credits.278
Up until 2012, LEED’s certified wood credit under its Materials and Resources (MR) category only
recognized wood products certified by the Forest Stewardship Council ("FSC"), an international not forprofit, multi-stakeholder organization established in 1993 to promote responsible and sustainable
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management of the world’s forests and timber.279 In 2012, the MR credit was reduced to a requirement of at
least 50% FSC-certified wood. FSC’s governing members are either individuals or organization
representatives, who all come from diverse backgrounds such as environmental NGOs, the timber trade,
community forest groups, and forest certification organizations.280 Members apply to join one of three
chambers – environmental, social and economic.281 Each chamber is divided into northern and southern subchambers, and votes are weighted to ensure that north and south each have 50% of the votes.282 It also has
three levels of decision making bodies: The General Assembly, the Board of Directors, and the Executive
Director.283 The standards combine the three chamber’s requirements into 10 ‘principles’ and 56 ‘criteria’
that further define the principles, and the criteria is given further detail in standards developed for specific
countries and regions and certification protocols.284 Certification of compliance with FSC standards is done
by certifiers that are organizationally independent of both the FSC and the forest owner.285 Only an FSC
accredited certification body can evaluate, monitor, and certify companies to FSC standards, and are charged
annual fees to renew their accreditation.286 If the forest management is in full compliance with FSC
requirements, the FSC certificate is awarded, but if the forest management is not in full compliance, certain
conditions must be met before the FSC certificate can be awarded.287 After certification is awarded, the FSC
accredited certification bodies audit each FSC certificate at least once a year.288 If the certification body finds
that a company is not complying with FSC requirements, Corrective Action Requests (CARs) are issued and
the company is required to make the prescribed changes within a given timeframe or lose its FSC
certificate.289

Advantages and Disadvantages
Advantages
Environmental labeling differs from regulation because it rewards environmental leadership. It is “a
market-based and consumer-orientated approach to dealing with various environmental issues.”290 The
theory behind eco-labeling generally is that it is a way for producers and consumers to mutually benefit while
reducing their environmental impacts. These labels allow people to make more informed purchasing
decisions that reflect their environmental values. “Product labels are informational devices that signal a
specific quality of a product, which in most cases cannot be directly observed by the consumer. In doing so,
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environmental labels reduce the complexities surrounding the production and distribution of goods and
transpose them into a dichotomous claim of meeting a standard or not.” 291 In turn, environmental labels
allow manufacturers to advertise the reduced environmental impacts of their products, which may be difficult
for the average shopper to determine, giving them an edge over the competition.292 By differentiating their
products as environmentally superior, consumer demand increases, and manufacturers will be able to charge
a price premium, which in turn encourages the development of new technology and innovation.293 As
Boström and Klintman note,294 “green labeling essentially relies on symbolic differentiation... The label says
implicitly that this product is different from other products.”
Consumers, producers, and the economy are not the only beneficiaries from eco-labels. The primary
objective of environmental labels is to generate net environmental benefits by substituting “conventional”
products with eco-labeled ones.295 When done right, an environmental label can “encourag[e] the efficient
management of renewable resources to ensure their availability to future generations; promot[e] efficient use
of non-renewable resources; facilitate[e] the reduction, reuse, and recycling of industrial, commercial, and
consumer waste; encourage[e] the protection of ecosystems and species diversity; and encourage[e] the
proper management of chemicals in products.”296
The benefit of having an eco-labeling program run by a third party is greater consumer acceptance and
less corporate greenwashing activity. Recent surveys have indicated that although consumers are seeking
environmentally responsible products, they are distrustful of environmental claims.297 If experts do the
technical footwork that goes beyond the capacities of the average consumer, the consumer does not have to
expend as much energy, time and cost in sifting through environmental data and researching claims.298
Shifting consumer preferences to products with third party certification will then encourage manufacturers to
have their environmental claims certified, resulting in a reduction of greenwashing activity. 299 The benefit of
a private third party label over a government-sponsored label is beneficial to the government because it
reduces the time, staff, effort, and cost involved in implementing and overseeing the program.
Disadvantages
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Eco-labels do not solve all of concerns, however. For example, consumer confusion over
environmental claims, terms, and verification may ultimately continue. “Ironically, the potentially
importance of eco-labels has led to a proliferation of them, and to a multitude of types and degrees of
meaningfulness and integrity."300 Competitor products can often sport two to three different eco-labels each,
leaving the consumer in the dark to attempt to discern the first party claims from the third party eco-labels,
the legitimate eco-labels from the illegitimate ones. Not all labels are created equally. On the opposite end of
the spectrum from Green Seal, which is generally highly regarded,301 are eco-labels which, for example,
allow companies to display the label on the product immediately following registration,302 charge licensing
fees as low as $15 dollars,303 fail to perform a thorough LCA analysis,304 or to periodically audit
manufacturers to ensure continued compliance.305 The rapid increase in proliferation of eco labels in the
market is also accompanied by a high level of redundancy.306 Competing private eco-labels,307 or overlapping
government and private eco-labels, co-exist to the detriment of consumers.308 309 Consumer confusion is
also compounded by “false labels,” which use an image that looks like an official third party label, when no
third party endorsement actually exists.310 In the U.S., most regulations have focused on curbing the
perceived abuses arising out of first party, Type II claims. To date, with the exception of the 2012 Green
Guides’ language around seals of approval311, and limited EPA involvement312, there has been little
government oversight of third-party labeling claims.313 And there are more eco labels than ever, with over
400 currently in existence.314 This lack of legislation and the increase in companies wishing to enter the
third-party certification market presents the problem of multiple labels with differing standards, varying
degrees of legitimacy, and overlapping coverage competing for consumer recognition, making it difficult for
consumers to determine which eco-labels to trust. Competing private labels may cause labeling schemes in
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general to lose their coherence and credibility, for the same reasons that the profusion of vague, first party
“greenwashing” claims in the early 1990s led to the FTC and federal government to step in and a trend
toward third party certifications.315 The result of too many labels could therefore, ironically, be consumer
confusion and distrust. Additionally, some companies argue that the lack of a label in a product category can
be construed by the consumer as a denial of a label, when in fact the product actually has little impact on the
environment.316 Consumers may believe that all products are reviewed, rather than recognizing that most
labels are voluntary, and not take into account that cost or time could have prevented use of the label.317
The adoption of eco-labels is seen variously as an opportunity for increased sales through product
differentiation, increased accountability, or increased choice for consumers in a greening retail
environment. The reality often is too many products, too much information, too little time, and a
paucity of independent, accessible, readily accessible and understandable information about
environmental performance.318
The leading method of environmental labeling assessment, Life Cycle Analysis (LCA), may also
present a problem.319 LCA has not been perfected, nor is there a generally accepted technique for conducting
the calculation, particularly at the impact analysis and investigation analysis stages.320 Additionally, the
“complexity and limitations of full-life cycle assessment methodologies have resulted in the use of relatively
simpler and less comprehensive methods of environmental performance review”, whereby “after
consideration of the life cycle of a product, programs usually focus on a few key attributes… and assess the
range of industry performance in those areas.”321 Therefore, programs using LCA are varying in their use and
applying varying degrees of comprehensiveness.322 Given that there are no eco-labels that currently conduct
a true comprehensive life-cycle assessment, each is open to challenges that its criteria selection is based on
too few attributes.
Lack of industry participation is another noted disadvantage.323 Voluntary environmental labeling
programs are subject to voluntary participation by industry. However, the costs, both in terms of direct costs
and potential civil and criminal liability exposure, of obtaining a third party eco-label or developing a
propriety first party label may be prohibitive to small and mid-sized manufacturers, and competing labels and
the regulatory schemes may make companies wary of obtaining a label.324 It has also been suggested that
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price considerations will overcome any environmental benefits in the final product decisions by consumers.
These and other factors could drive industry away from making an effort to label their products.325
Moreover, it has been argued that an environmental labeling program may in fact reduce ongoing
innovation because of insufficient and unpredictable consumer demand, and because manufacturers may only
seek to achieve innovation at the level established by the standards.326 This problem is particularly
concerning with government imposed mandatory labels.327 Although standards can be periodically reviewed
and updated, the process takes time.
Finally, while voluntary certification programs offer a “carrot” for environmentally friendly
companies, unlike regulations or mandatory labels, they don’t provide a “stick” to deter false claims.328 There
are no fines to pay or injunctions to face – the manufacturer merely faces the risk of losing market share to
products that satisfy consumer’s environmental preferences.

IV.

Credible Third Party Certification: Not the End of the Road

All questions aside regarding which forms of eco-labels are the most effective,329 use of a voluntary
eco-label, whether governmental or privately issued, appears to be a promising way for a company to avoid
greenwashing liability. However, the choice to use eco-labels is not always a straightforward one – any
company that chooses to do so must also consider several other potential legal consequences. Clearly,
independent eco-labeling helps prevent greenwashing, but not all independent eco-labeling is good ecolabeling. The governmental agencies and private standard setting organizations that issue these eco-labels
must themselves comply with general bodies of established law.330 Therefore, companies that rely on
voluntary eco-labels also run the risk of facing imputed liability from their participation in these programs.
A. Unfair/Deceptive Advertising Practices under the Consumer Protection Laws
Private third party eco-labels and the companies that rely on them, can be subject to the same type of
deceptive advertising disputes that currently burden first party manufacturer greenwashing claims.331 As
discussed in section II, there is a large spectrum of credibility when it comes to eco-labels. The problem is
that even a highly regarded private third party eco-label can be the subject of deceptive advertising scrutiny.
A 2009 FTC complaint filed by the Coalition for Fair Forest Certification (CFFC) is highlights this issue.332
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The CFFC asked the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, via Section 5 and the Green Guides, to investigate the
FSC label for several reasons.333 One allegation was that the variance of national and regional standards
promulgated by the FSC, coupled with the fact that FSC labels do not disclose under which standard a wood
product may have been certified, makes it difficult for consumers to substantiate FSC product claims in a
meaningful way.334 It highlighted that in North America alone, there are 13 different regional standards, with
nine of those in the U.S, making for a highly complex and scattered system.335 Moreover, it noted, in
countries without an accepted national standard, FSC permits certification bodies to certify according to their
own “interim” standards, which do not meet with ISO or ISEAL Alliance requirements.336 Also troubling is
that “depending on geographic region, the FSC standards may be stringent or lenient,337 and can differ
significantly in form and content.”338 This complex web allegedly makes it “extremely difficult for
consumers to understand under what conditions FSC-certified products are grown.”339 Adding to that
confusion is that fact that under this widely varying system, timber grown in one of FSC’s nine U.S. regions
may meet standards in the region in which it was grown, but perhaps not in a neighboring region.340
Likewise, some timber grown internationally may meet a FSC standard offshore, but not in the U.S.341
“Nevertheless, all timber meeting the applicable local FSC standard is marketed under the same label.” 342
Other allegations include evidence that FSC’s auditors and certifying bodies were not holding certified
sources to FSC’s standards, and that FSC’s claim that it’s Controlled Wood standard, integral to FSC’s
“Mixed Sources” label (which allows manufacturers to mix FSC certified material with non-certified
material) was actually inflated and in fact allowed wood “prohibited” categories to be certified.343
This example highlights the fact that reliance on third party eco-labels is not the end of the deceptive
advertising inquiry.344
B. Antitrust Law
While a manufacturer may find reliance upon green certification from a voluntary program appealing
to reduce the risk of deceptive advertising litigation, the manufacturer and all parties involved in the process
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Another complaint illustrative of this point is the 2013 complaint filed with the FTC by the Washington Forest Law Center against SFI, FSC’s
biggest competitor. Specifically, it alleged that in violation of the Green Guide provisions, (1) SFI’s claim that it is an “independent nonprofit public
charitable organization” is deceptive, is likely to mislead the public, (2) SFI’s forest management standards were not developed by a “voluntary
consensus body,” and (3) that because SFI’s standards are so vague that an auditor cannot apply them objectively, its claims of third-party
certification are deceptive. Letter from the Washington Forest Law Center, (WFLC) to the Federal Trade Commission on behalf of ForestEthics and
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should be mindful of their participation in these cooperative endeavors to ensure that participation is
structured to comply with antitrust standards.345 346
The three major antitrust laws that affect standard-setting are the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and
the Federal Trade Commission Act.347 Depending on the circumstances, antitrust challenges to standard
setting can be brought by private litigants, the FTC, the DOJ, and state Attorneys General.348 Although
standard-setting activities are typically litigation-centered, government review of proposed standard-setting
activities may also be brought on a voluntary basis through the DOJ business review or FTC advisory
opinion processes.349
Antitrust analysis of allegations regarding adoption and implementation of standards usually
involves a need to determine whether the anticompetitive effects of a standard outweigh its precompetitive
benefits.350 This analysis ultimately focuses on who sets the standard.351 This is an important question
because different antitrust rules may apply to different types of economic actors.352 Standards are generally
sourced from three different areas: the government, cooperative industry collaborations, and uncoordinated,
unilateral processes in the competitive marketplace.353
Cooperative standard setting would include the formal SSO bodies and industry associations that
issue eco-labels. “How cooperatively a standard is developed and by who, as well as the actual substance of
the standard,” are all important to assessing the antitrust liability.354 Challenges relating to cooperative efforts
may raise both collusion and exclusion concerns.355 Collusion claims are claims that the standards enable, or
themselves create improper coordination among competitors.356 Exclusions claims are claims that the
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(HR 1086), (Sept. 9 2004), available at
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counterclaims against accrediting body for denying it accreditation.)
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ABA Handbook, supra note 347, at 27. See generally Antitrust Division Business Review Procedure, 28 CFR sec. 50.6 (2000); Federal Trade
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U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992). I do not discuss unilateral standard setting, as eco-labels do not appear to be commonly created this
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standards improperly exclude or disadvantage a firm or firms and thereby harm the competitive process.357
Challenges to cooperative standard setting practices are most often brought under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act358, which prohibits agreements in restraint of trade, but can also be brought under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act359, which prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization, and conspiracy to
monopolize.360 Challenges can also be brought by the FTC under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act361, which prohibits unfair methods of competition and deceptive trade practices.362 In evaluating standard
setting activities among competitors, the FTC and DOJ typically apply the principles outlined in the Antitrust
Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (the Competitor Collaboration Guidelines.)363
There are several aspects of cooperative eco-label standard-setting and certification activity that may
cause anti-competitive effects. One major area where disputes may arise that is particularly relevant to this
subject of this paper is regarding the composition or membership of an SSO or trade association.364 “In some
cases, a plaintiff may claim that an SSO… improperly excluded certain industry participants or competitors
from the organization and the standard-setting process. In others cases, a plaintiff may challenge the decision
of an SSO… not to admit, or to discipline, suspend, or expel the plaintiff from the organization for failure to
adhere to the organizations by laws or membership criteria.” 365 Another area of contention is the selection
and enforcement of the standards.366 In developing a standard, an SSO or trade association will often select a
particular product, technology, or methodology and reject alternatives.367 “The decision to adopt one element
over another may cause ‘excluded’ competitors to claim that the SSO or the ‘winning’ firm violated the
antitrust laws. Similarly, once a standard is adopted, an SSO may evaluate whether a particular product meets
the requirements of the standard and may “certify” compliance with the standard with its ‘seal of approval.’
Manufacturers whose products are denied certification sometimes brings antitrust claims against the SSO or
those firms whose products are certified.”368 A third area of concern is corruption of the standard-setting
process, which involves claims that the standard setting or certification process was improperly manipulated
357
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in order to gain competitive advantage over rivals.369 A fourth area of concern is restrictions on access to
standards.370
Turning to government-imposed standards, “local, state, and federal governments often adopt (or
encourage adoption of) standards that were initially created by private SSOs.”371 In doing so, the actions of
federal government agencies are exempt from antitrust challenge.372 Conduct by a state is typically shielded
from antitrust immunity under the Parker “state action doctrine,” but not always.373 The Parker state action
doctrine “has been extended in certain circumstances to private activity undertaken pursuant to a state
statutory scheme.”374 “Where competitors are excluded by a state-imposed standard or the standard results in
decreased industry competition, a question arises as to whether the standard is immune from successful
antitrust attack under the state action doctrine.”375 This will depend on the degree of state involvement in
establishing or implementing standards.376 “If a private SSO sets a standard that is not expressly adopted by
the state and claims that the standard implements a state policy, this private conduct will only receive Parker
immunity if it meets the two part Midcal test.”377
In addition to state action, solicitation of government action can raise antitrust concerns.378 SSOs
“routinely petition governmental or quasi-governmental entities to adopt standards or codes that may affect
many different aspects of business and industry…. While Parker recognized the states own ability to engage
in anti-competitive regulation, it did not immunize from antitrust liability private parties who petition
governmental or quasi-governmental entities to adopt anticompetitive regulation.”379 “While petitioning
activity is generally immune from antitrust liability under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, related conduct
causing competitive harm not flowing from the adoption of a standard by a government entity is not
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immune.”380 The central issue is whether the challenged conduct qualifies as petitioning of government
authorities, rather than independent commercial conduct. 381
Applying this analysis to the USGBC’s LEED system and the FSC certification system discussed
earlier, controlling antitrust law suggests that a claim could be brought against the USGBC and FSC, and its
individual members, based on LEED’s exclusive endorsement of FSC products.382 FSC’s processes do not
escape antitrust scrutiny either—it’s also been claimed at that FSC’s bylaws and organization structure is
designed to “suppress the concerns of forest owners and industry interests…” 383

C. International Trade Law
The primary criticism of eco-labeling when it comes to international trade law is the fear that it may
act as an unjustified non-tariff barrier to trade in certain instances.384 There are a number of reasons for this
concern.385 First, domestic producers of products are in a better position than exporters to influence the
choice of product groups and criteria used for developing standards and awarding labels.386 Second, because
these standards are rarely established in consistency with established international standardization rules that
emphasize non-discrimination and transparency, many times foreign producers are forced to meet criteria
that are not relevant in their country of production, therefore imposing extra costs.387 Third, developing
countries are more vulnerable to this discriminatory trade impact as often they “lack resources to undertake
the costly testing, verification, plant inspection, and certification procedures required for compliance” with
some of the stricter labels.388 In addition to the high cost of compliance is the lack of adequate knowledge
about such labels—often foreign producers are unaware of certification needs or where and by whom
certification is provided.389
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The status of the certification programs in international trade law is “somewhat ambiguous.” 390
There are several Agreements under the WTO that have rules related to eco-labels: the GATT, the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).391 Each
of these agreements has its own set of rules but there are overlaps between sets.392
“However, as these agreements were negotiated mostly without specific knowledge of or concern
about eco-labeling, a good deal of uncertainty remains about which agreements applies to eco-labels,
under what circumstances, and to what extent. For the WTO, the key point is that labeling
requirements and practices should not discriminate either between trading partners (most favored
nation principles), or between domestically produced goods and services and imports (national
treatment).” 393
Drawing upon recent GATT decisions and “working group” reports conducted under by the GATT and the
OECD, the question of whether an environmental labeling program constitutes an illegal, non-tariff trade
barrier ultimately hinges on two factors: whether it is mandatory or voluntary; and whether it governs a
product characteristic or a PPM (particular production or process method).394
These concerns have led to the OECD UNCTAD, and the WTO to advocate international
harmonization, mutual recognition, and greater transparency in the operation of labeling programs.395
D. Tort Law
Tort law can also be a source of liability for certification organizations and companies.396 Several cases
have held standard setting organizations liable for injuries proximately caused by practices that conformed to
their standards but were found by courts not to constitute due care.397 Although not an eco-label case, a
notable example is injuries in swimming pools meeting standards.398 It is also possible that a certifying
organization could be sued for failing to detect a substandard practice in a firm that it inspects.399

E. Eco-Label Oversight, Harmonization, and Best Practices

Meidinger supra note 148, at 20-22 (“This ambiguity depends to some extent on the particular relationship of certification programs to states, since
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Currently, over 400 eco-labels are operative in 197 countries and 25 industry sectors400 and, as is
hopefully evident by now, not all are created equal. Consumer protection, antitrust, international trade, and
tort law and policy all reinforce the importance of inclusive, technically sound, consensus processes in
developing environmental standards. Several sources and organizations provide definitions of different types
of eco-labels and set out parameters and best practices, all with the goal of developing high quality eco-labels
that consumers can trust and that don’t run afoul of the various domestic and international laws touched on
above. Domestic efforts include the FTC’s Green Guides, the Standards Development Organization
Advancement Act of 2004, and ANSI. The three main international expert sources are the ISO, GEN, and
ISEAL.401 National and international efforts to standardize eco-label practices and standards is vitally
important given the multitude of eco-labels in existence and the fragmented regulatory environment.
However, much like the ironic fate that eco-labels suffer by often producing more consumer confusion, the
standardization efforts themselves often overlap, creating potential conflicts not only with one another, but
also with U.S. legislation.402
1. Oversight and Harmonization
International Organization for Standardization (ISO)
Developed in 1947, ISO is the world’s largest developer and publisher of international standards for
products, services, and best practice.403 It unites a network of national standards institutes from 164
countries to build consensus of global standard setting.404 Relevant to eco-labels is the ISO 14020 series of
standards that define parameters for developing environmental labels and declarations.405 This series
includes ISO 14024, 14021 and 14025, which define the parameters for Type I, II, and III eco-labels,
respectively.406 The series is considered to be international best practice on environmental labeling and
declarations on products and services.407

GEN
GEN is a member-based non-profit association of third-party environmental performance
recognition, certification, and labeling organizations (Type-I ecolabeling organizations) founded in 1994 to
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“improve, promote and develop the eco-labeling of products and services.”408 While GEN does not actually
develop criteria or certify products, it defines different types of eco-labels, categorizes existing eco-labels,
and sets generic environmental criteria for specific product and service categories.409 Currently comprised of
twenty-six national ecolabeling organizations that operate around the world, membership is limited to those
that share the GEN's objectives and meet its general criteria, providing assurance to the public that its
member organizations are meeting their parameters for eco-labeling. 410

ISEAL Alliance
ISEAL is a global association for social and environmental standards.411 It helps established and
emerging voluntary standard systems to develop and strengthen their standards, and helps companies,
governments, and non-profit organizations properly reference voluntary standards.412 They have developed a
set of principles for defining what makes an eco-label, standard, certification, and accreditation credible,
called the ISEAL Codes of Good Practice,413 as well as the Credibility Principles, which capture the
essentials of how to improve the uptake and effectiveness of standards to ensure standards systems deliver
positive impacts. 414

Federal Trade Commission
The 2012 revisions to the Green Guides added a new subsection called Certification and Seals of
Approval.415 To avoid misleading consumers, Example 2 says that marketers must meet standards that have
been “developed and maintained by a voluntary consensus standard body.”416 With respect to antitrust
concerns, footnote 2 references OMB Circular A‐ 119 for the definition of voluntary, consensus standards.417
With respect to deceptive advertising concerns, the revisions stress that third-party seals fall under the FTC’s
Endorsement Guidelines.418
Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004
408
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The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act of 2004, which as mentioned previously,419
provides a limited antitrust “safe harbor” for standards development organizations, conditions that protection
on an SDO’s participation in a voluntary, consensus processes.420 It also references OMB Circular A‐
119.421 By explicitly linking standard setting activity to antitrust law, the Act provides some useful guidance
on avoiding antitrust litigation.
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
ANSI is a private non-profit organization422 that oversees the development of voluntary consensus
standards for products, services, processes, systems, and personnel in the U.S.423 In addition to facilitating
the formation of standards in the U.S., ANSI “promotes the use of U.S. standards internationally, advocates
U.S. policy and technical positions in international and regional standards organizations, and encourages the
adoption of international standards as national standards."424 It does so in its capacity as the official U.S.
representative to the ISO, of which it is a founding member.425 ANSI itself does not develop standards – it
oversees and accredits standards that are developed by government agencies, consumer groups, companies,
and other standards organizations.426 It also provides accreditation to organizations that provide product
certification under international standards.427
2. Best Practices
Although each of the above organizations differ in their criteria used to evaluate label claims and
certifying group’s standard development procedures, several key best practices emerge for eco-label
programs to follow that are common to all.
Environmentally meaningful, attainable, and verifiable standards
“Maintenance of stringent technical requirements based on good ecological science assures consumers that
they can trust the eco-label and licensing applicants that they will be treated fairly.”428 These standards
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should be verifiable by the certifying group or another independent inspection organization.429 Product
environmental criteria should be based on life-cycle considerations to ensure that all aspects of a product’s
development, delivery, use, and end-of-life options have been taken into account.430 Given that the ISO
14000 series of standards is considered international best practice, eco-label programs should strive to
achieve consistency with these principles.431
Flexibility
“In order to be credible and effective, programs must operate in a business-like and cost-effective manner
consistent with market forces and requirements. They must be able to respond in a timely way to
technological and market changes. This requires, for example, periodic review and, when necessary, update
of both environmental award criteria and categories, taking into account technological and marketplace
developments. Periodic review (usually every three years) ensures that standards and criteria levels keep pace
with new developments.”432
Consistency
“An eco-label used on one product should have the same meaning if used on other products. Standards
should be verifiable in a consistent manner for different products.”433
Transparency and Accountable Process.
A transparent and accountable program will be open to observation, monitoring, and questioning at any time.
“The organization behind an eco-label should make information about organizational structure, funding,
board of directors, and certification standards available to the public.”434 Additionally, an open process
necessitates public comment. “All certification standards should be developed with input from multiple
stakeholders including consumers, industry, environmentalists and social representatives in a way that
doesn't compromise the independence of the certifier. Industry representatives, for example, can play an
important advisory role without having direct financial, decision making or management ties to the
certifier.”435
Independence and Multi-stakeholder Participation
A credible program should be free of vested commercial interests, which should extend to the processes of
selecting product category and award criteria.436 To avoid the perception of excessive and imbalanced
influence from a particular industry or stakeholder, it is crucial that multiple different stakeholders and
interested groups are represented, including members from industry, environment, consumer, academic and
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scientific, and government sectors.437 In addition, “certifying organizations and their employees should not
have any ties to, and should not receive any funding, sales fees, or contributions, from logo users except fees
for certification.”438 Affiliation between employees of companies whose products are certified, or who are
applying for certification, with the certifier, whether the certifier is the SSO or a third party, should be
scrutinized and monitored.439

V.

Conclusion

As consumer consciousness of environmental issues continues to drive green purchasing habits,
greenwashing claims will continue to pervade the market. Although there are several methods of combatting
greenwashing, each with varying degrees of effectiveness, the reality is that the current framework for
policing greenwashing is an intricate, fragmented, and often redundant web of many bodies of law and
market based solutions. Moreover, reliance on credible independently-issued eco-labels, while currently the
most promising anti-greenwashing tool, is not without risks. Further complicating the area is that the efforts
to standardize those eco-labels suffer from the same redundancy that the regulations and eco-labels
themselves do. Given that reality, and the fact that a streamlining of anti-greenwashing and eco-label
regulation does not appear to be in the immediate future, both manufacturers and third party endorsers must
structure their involvement in the green marketing space very carefully. Fortunately, there are steps and best
practices that each can take to minimize the risk of litigation.
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